Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism compares states to billiard balls, meaning they behave similarly under similar structural conditions. States with identical capabilities often behave differently in response to the same systemic limits and requirements due to constraints and opportunities. Neorealism is still considered a masterful theory for explaining international dynamics during the Cold War, even though bipolarity explanations seemed unable to accurately predict the relationship between systemic settings and state behavior. Even with a new structural framework, it remains an accepted worldwide system theory. Nevertheless, even during the Cold War, some instances diverged from the billiard ball analogy. The Turkish operation in Cyprus is an example of these outliers. Türkiye defied the bloc leader, notably the US, and even engaged in conflict with a bloc partner, Greece, in the face of possible USSR involvement, in defiance to strong resistance from the bloc leader. The conflict caused Greece to leave NATO’s military wing during the Cold War and high inter-bloc tension. Thus, Türkiye’s “departure from basic neorealist assumptions” is thought-provoking and questions the relationship between the system, state behavior, and how states may take risks when faced with unique threat perceptions and neorealism's underlying assumptions. This study seeks to explain why and how Türkiye, despite its proximity to the USSR and its Middle Eastern allies, could act differently and take a significant risk in the face of rigid bipolar systemic structural risks, defying neorealist expectations about the “moves of a billiard ball” under rigid systemic contours.